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Interference with Bottom-Up
Feature Detection






Drawing portraits upside down is a trick that allows
novice artists to reproduce lower-level image features,
e.g., contours, while reducing interference from
higher-level face cognition. Limiting the available pro-
cessing time to suffice for lower- but not higher-level
operations is a more general way of reducing interfer-
ence. We elucidate this interference in a novel visual-
search task to find a target among distractors. The tar-
get had a unique lower-level orientation feature but
was identical to distractors in its higher-level object
shape. Through bottom-up processes, the unique fea-
ture attracted gaze to the target [1–3]. Subsequently,
recognizing the attended object as identically shaped
as the distractors, viewpoint invariant object recogni-
tion [4, 5] interfered. Consequently, gaze often aban-
doned the target to search elsewhere. If the search
stimulus was extinguished at time T after the gaze
arrived at the target, reports of target location were
more accurate for shorter (T < 500 ms) presentations.
Thisobject-to-feature interference, thoughperhapsun-
expected, could underlie common phenomena such
as the visual-search asymmetry that finding a familiar
letter N among its mirror images is more difficult than
the converse [6]. Our results should enable additional
examination of known phenomena and interactions
between different levels of visual processes.
Results and Discussion
Among the 45 left-tilted bars in Figure 1, a uniquely
right-tilted bar, 45 or 20 from the vertical in conditions
Asimple or Bsimple, pops out. However, superposing a hor-
izontal or vertical bar on each original bar makes the
uniquely tilted bar much harder to find in condition A
than condition B of Figure 1. The target object in condi-
tion A but not B is a rotated and sometimes also a mirror-
reversed version of all distractor objects, easily con-
fused with the distractors because object recognition
is typically rotationally or viewpoint invariant. We sug-
gest that the higher-level perception of the object com-
prising the two intersecting bars interferes with the task
of locating it based on its unique lower-level orientation
feature component.
Primitive features, like the orientations of small bars,
of visual inputs are first extracted by the primary visual
cortex (V1) [7]. Then these features are combined into
*Correspondence: z.li@ucl.ac.ukobjects, e.g., composed of two intersecting bars [8, 9],
by higher cortical areas, including the inferotemporal
(IT) cortex, whose neurons are selective to object
shapes [10–15]. V1 is not only a way station; its activities
also highlight salient items because of its sensitivity to
unique low-level features such as orientation [16–18].
In addition to driving the higher visual areas such as
V4, which combines bottom-up and top-down factors
[19–21], V1’s saliency signal also evokes cognitive deci-
sions by driving superior colliculus, which controls sac-
cades [3]. Behaviorally and preattentively, unique image
features such as orientation and color can pop out [1],
and an object’s basic features such as ‘‘vertical’’ and
‘‘red,’’ but not its overall shape, can be obtained [22].
Meanwhile, an important characteristic of the progres-
sion from feature to object processing is making object
recognition viewpoint independent [23] and thus achiev-
ing object invariance. Some IT neurons are indeed in-
sensitive to viewpoint [10–12]. IT activities also correlate
with the planning of saccades [24]. There is thus a hierar-
chy of levels of cognition and their consequent decisions
and actions. Behaviorally, attentive exposure to an ob-
ject’s image can prime its subsequent recognition
regardless of viewpoint but can prime its recognition
only in the same view if the exposure was unattended [4].
The observations above suggest the following rele-
vant processing stages: (1) an early preattentive stage
that processes image features, e.g., orientations of ob-
ject components, and makes unique features salient
[1]; and (2) a later, attentive [4] stage that creates a view-
point-invariant object representation [1, 5], e.g., a shape
from two intersecting bars. For locating a target pos-
sessing a uniquely oriented bar in the display, the early
stage suffices because the salient unique orientation
can attract gaze. The later, attentive object-processing
stage is commonly expected to facilitate processing of
the components of the objects through top-down feed-
back [25]. However, when differently oriented but other-
wise identical distractors are present, as in condition A
but not B of Figure 1, viewpoint-invariant object recogni-
tion could make search harder. If so, briefer stimulus
viewings (within a time window), preventing invariant
object recognition, should improve target localization
in condition A but not B. We show exactly this below.
In experiment I, subjects searched among 660 objects,
in a display extending 46 3 34 of visual angle, for the
object with the uniquely tilted oblique bar. The search
stimulus was of conditions Asimple, Bsimple, A, or B (Fig-
ure 1) or control conditions. The nonoblique, task-irrele-
vant bar in the target of condition A or B was randomly
either horizontal or vertical (the task-relevant bar in con-
dition B was always 20 from this irrelevant bar). The sub-
jects were a priori informed about the uniquely oriented
target bar and that this unique orientation could be ran-
domly tilted to the left or right in each trial. They were
asked to press a left or right button quickly to indicate
whether the target was in the left or right half of the dis-
play. Their eye positions were tracked.
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27Figure 1. Small Portions of Visual-Search
Displays
The target possesses the uniquely left- or
right-tilted (as in these examples) bar in the
entire display. In conditions Asimple and
Bsimple (top), all bars were 45
 from vertical,
except the target bar in Bsimple, which was
20 from vertical (in this example) or horizon-
tal. Conditions A and B (bottom), derived
from Asimple and Bsimple, differed only in the
angle, 45 and 20, respectively, between
the two bars in the target. Task-irrelevant,
horizontal and vertical, bars made the orien-
tation singleton much harder to find in condi-
tion A than in condition B.Figure 2 shows that reaction times (RTs) for the sub-
ject’s first gaze arrival to the target, RTeyes, were compa-
rable in conditions A and B. This is unsurprising because
the target in both conditions had the uniquely oriented
bar. This bar is salient preattentively [1, 2], attracting
both attention and gaze, the latter because of the man-
datory link between the directions of attention and gaze
in free viewing [26]. These RTeyes were longer than thosein conditions Asimple and Bsimple mainly because the non-
uniform orientations of the task-irrelevant (horizontal
and vertical) bars reduced the target’s saliency [27].
However, the RTs for reporting the target location by
button press, RThands, were typically more than 122 s
longer in condition A than B, even though A and B had
comparable button-response accuracies. In condition
A, after gaze first reached the target, it often dawdledFigure 2. Hand and Gaze Responses in
Experiment I
(A and B) Examples of gaze scan paths. The
one in (A) is for an arrive-abandon-return
(AAR) trial. Asterisks and open circles mark
the locations for targets and fixation points,
respectively; the grid frames the spatial ex-
tent of the stimuli. Blue and red scan paths,
respectively, are for those before and after
the first gaze’s arrival to the target and before
the button press.
(C) Data for three subjects, denoted by red,
green, and blue hues, respectively. Asterisks
indicate significant differences between con-
ditions for the subject. The left graphs show
RThand and RTeye (top of lighter- and darker-
colored bars, respectively) for button re-
sponses and first gaze at target, respectively.
The right graphs show task performances,
percentage of arrive-abandon return (AAR)
scan paths (e.g., [A]), and eye-to-hand laten-
cies in non-AAR trials for conditions A and B
only. All error bars show SEM.
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28Figure 3. Experiment II: The Longer One Looks, the Worse One ‘‘Sees’’
(A) Sequence of events in a gaze-contingent trial.
(B) A small portion of an example of a mask stimulus.
(C) With longer gaze-to-mask latency T, target localization in condition A (in blocked sessions) worsened, and the gazes are more likely to have
abandoned the target before mask onset. Asterisks denote data points significantly smaller in value than that for T = 0. GSBM trials are those in
which gaze stayed (at target) before mask onset.
(D) In sessions interleaving conditions A and B (for another subject group), performances in conditions A and B are comparable for T = 0. Com-
bining both T > 0 values, performance in B is significantly better than that in A (p = 0.01). Error bars show SEM.around the target before the button press or even aban-
doned the target to search elsewhere before returning to
it prior to the button press (Figure 2A). Such arrive-aban-
don-return (AAR) scan paths were much rarer in condi-
tion B. Even for the non-AAR trials, the eye-to-hand
latency RThand 2 RTeye was much longer in condition A
than in B. These observations are consistent with the hy-
pothesis that decision processes vetoed the first guess
by the feature detectors in condition A because the
attended object was recognized as having the same
shape as the distractors, i.e., invariant object recogni-
tion could be interfering.
An alternative explanation consistent with the data
could be that somehow targets in condition A but not
condition B become less visible under foveal viewing
than peripheral viewing. To test between the hypothe-
ses of interference by invariant object recognition and
of foveal visibility reduction, we examined conditions A
and B in experiment II, in which the search stimulus
was masked after a seemingly random time interval
since its onset (Figure 3A). The subjects button-pressed
for the target location as before, but could respond with-
out time pressure, before or after the mask onset, and
guess if they had to. The mask (Figure 3B) covered
each original object, whether target or distractor, with
a star-shaped object and made the original object im-
perceptible. A random half of the trials in each sessionwere gaze-contingent trials, in which mask onset oc-
curred and reduced visibility of the original stimulus to
zero at one of several predetermined time intervals T af-
ter gaze first arrived at the target. The other trials had
random mask-onset times; some were gaze-opposite
trials, in which the gaze position at mask onset was on
one (e.g., left) side the display center and the target
was on the opposite (e.g. right) side of the display cen-
ter, and were designed to prevent subjects’ awareness
of any link between mask onset and eye position (see
Experimental Procedures).
Figure 3C shows that for condition A, target localiza-
tion worsened with longer gaze-to-mask viewing time
T % 1–2 s. This is not because the button presses
tended to agree with the eye positions at mask onset;
among the gaze-opposite trials, only 56% of the button
presses agreed with the eye positions at mask onset.
Furthermore, the performance for T = 0, when target vis-
ibility became zero immediately upon foveal viewing, is
comparable to that without the mask in experiment I,
when the stimulus was viewed as long as was deemed
necessary by the subjects. This suggests that the extra
viewing time T > 0, or a longer duration of target visibility
(even if reduced), is unnecessary and can be detrimental
for target localization for some T. Apparently, the sub-
jects had a good first guess of the target location based
on image features (orientations of the bars) alone before
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29Figure 4. Factors Affecting Object-to-Fea-
ture Interference
(A) In experiment II, performance across T >
0 for condition A was somewhat better (p =
0.08) in blocked sessions (one session each
subject) than in sessions interleaved with
condition B (two sessions each subject), in
which subjects had higher expectations for
uniquely shaped target.
(B) Reduction of interference with experi-
ence—for longer gaze-to-mask time T in ex-
periment II, performance for condition A im-
proved in the second experimental session
(significantly at T value with an asterisk next
to the data points). The data in Figure 3D
were replotted here according to the two
separate sessions.
(C) Stronger or weaker object-to-feature in-
terference, manifested in RThand 2 RTeye in
experiment I, by, respectively, higher or lower
orientation variabilities of the distractors for
reducing or enhancing bottom-up pop-out
strength manifested in RTeye (same three
subjects as those in Figure 2, denoted by
blue, red, and green colors). The RThand 2
RTeye in condition A
0, although reduced from
that of A, is significantly longer (p = 0.002)
than that of B0. In the right graph, data points
of different conditions are plotted in different
colors. Stimulus examples of conditions A0,
B0, and A0simple are shown in the Supplemen-
tal Data. Error bars show SEM.they got confused by invariant object recognition, which
likely caused them to abandon target (the non-GSBM
trials in Figure 3C) and give incorrect responses. Eventu-
ally, their confusion subsided. Some subjects reported
that sometimes they thought they found the target,
only for it to disappear when they took a second look.
In experimental sessions interleaving conditions A and
B (for another group of subjects), extra viewing time
T > 0 improved performance in condition B marginally
but worsened performance in A (Figure 3D). Meanwhile,
the fact that the performances for the two conditions at
T = 0 are comparable is consistent with the comparable
RTeyes in these conditions in experiment I (Figure 2).
Our finding is the first we know of providing quantita-
tive psychophysical data to suggest that deeper cogni-
tive processing can be detrimental to some visual cogni-
tive tasks—a likely explanation for the portrait-drawing
trick. In particular, invariant object recognition interfered
with lower-level feature processes’ abilities to detect
unique salient features. Here, the later-stage processes
for object recognition are at best unnecessary for our
task. Our findings suggest that they actually overwrite
or interfere with the decisions of the necessary and ear-
lier feature processes, even though, in principle, they do
not have to do so. The uniqueness of the orientation of
the target’s component bar is sufficient to make the tar-
get location salient. Previous physiological and compu-
tational studies [16–18, 2] have indicated that V1 can de-
tect and highlight such a salient feature and direct gaze
to it via the superior colliculus [3].
Although some forms of object recognition can occur
quickly [28, 29] and without attention or awareness [5,
30], psychophysical data have indicated that view-
point-invariant object representation needs attention
[4, 22]. Accordingly, our findings suggest that the later,interfering stage does not only construct object from
features but also allows top-down attention to build in-
variant object representations. This is consistent with
the mandatory link between the directions of gaze and
attention in free viewing [26]. Thus, our finding can
also be seen as the interference of top-down attentional
processes with bottom-up processes, and this interfer-
ence introduces nontrivial complexity to the temporal
and performance differences between higher- and
lower-level processes [31–33]. Our finding also con-
trasts with backward visual masking [34] in which inat-
tention enables a mask to impair object recognition.
Figure 3C suggests that building the invariant object
representation requires at least 100 ms of attentive
viewing for objects in our stimuli.
Our analysis suggests the following factors as being
conducive to interference: (1) tasks being feature based,
not requiring object recognition; (2) object recognition or
top-down knowledge, or both, introducing additional
signals, which has sufficient weight to counteract the
low level feature’s contribution to task-relevant deci-
sions. Comparing condition A in blocked versus inter-
leaved (with condition B) sessions (Figure 4A) suggests
that an increased expectation for a unique target shape
(in the interleaved session) increases interference. This
is unsurprising because the expectation should increase
the weight of factor (2) above. Analogously, we can re-
duce interference by increasing the weight of the bot-
tom-up factor and thus decreasing the relative weight
of the factor (2). For instance, when the task-irrelevant
bars in conditions A and B are all horizontal or all vertical
so that distractors are uniformly oriented, the target be-
comes more salient. We call these modified conditions
A0 and B0, respectively. This reduces RTeye significantly.
Consequently, the feature-level influences could more
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decision threshold could be reached before object-to-
feature interference becomes more significant. Hence,
in experiment I interleaving conditions A0, B0, A, and B,
RThand 2 RTeye for A
0 is much shorter than for A, al-
though RThand 2 RTeye for A
0 is still significantly longer
than the two comparable RThand 2 RTeye values for B
and B0 (Figure 4C). Conversely, when the orientation var-
iability of distractors is increased in condition Asimple,
such that randomly 1/3 of the distractor bars become
oriented horizontally and another 1/3 become oriented
vertically, we call the resulting stimulus condition
A0simple. In this condition A0simple, object-to-feature inter-
ference arises by a RThand 2 RTeye longer than that in
condition B (Figure 4C). This suggests that even a simple
bottom-up orientation feature can, given sufficient pro-
cessing time, be treated as a viewpoint-invariant object
bar and make the target object bar a rotated version of
all distractor objects.
Our data also suggest that subjects can quickly learn
to remove the interference in condition A within two data
sessions involving no more than 260 trials per subjects
in experiment II (Figure 4B). Subjects reported discover-
ing helpful strategies of trusting their instincts, defocus-
ing the image, or letting the target pop out while fixating
on the center of display away from the peripheral target.
Peripheral visual field is more heavily sampled by the
magno celluar pathway, which, compared to the parvo
cellular pathway, is faster and processes coarser resolu-
tion inputs [35, 36]. Hence, the magno pathway likely
plays a greater role in detecting unique features and driv-
ing gaze in a bottom-up manner. This is consistent with
the idea that slower attentive process is associated
with finer spatial resolution than the faster bottom-up
processes. Defocusing and peripheral viewing probably
reduce the object-to-feature interference by selectively
emphasizing the magno pathway to speed up the bot-
tom-up process while removing the finer input details
to attenuate the attentive object-formation processes.
Although removing finer resolution could make two
intersecting bars resemble a single bar of the averaged
orientation, the observed object-to-feature interference
in condition A0simple (which has only disconnected bar
stimuli) suggests that viewing the objects as single
bars could not remove the interference if attentive object
formation proceeded. Hence, we predict that lesions
(clinical or by transcranial magnetic stimulation) of the
cortical areas responsible for attentive-object processes
(perhaps the parietal cortex, which has been implicated
in building objects from features [5]) could improve per-
formance in our task. Our findings only reveal a fraction
of the rich interactions between lower- and higher-level
cognitive processes. The results of such interactions
are unexpected if we assume that deepening of pro-
cesses should always lead to improved perception.
Different degrees of object-to-feature interference
may underlie common observations of visual-search
asymmetry between familiar and unfamiliar targets. For
example, a search for a familiar letter N among its mirror
reversals is performed more slowly than a search for a
mirror reversal among normal N’s [6, 37, 38]. Both
searches require the same low-level processes for de-
tecting orientation contrast between left- and right-tilted
bars and do not require letter recognition. However,familiarity of the letters should affect the object rather
than feature-level processing. Hence, the object-to-
feature interference, manifested in our task and likely
behind the portrait-drawing trick, can enable additional
examination of many known phenomena.
Experimental Procedures
Stimuli
Each stimulus display, viewed at a distance of 40 cm, had 660 object
items, each at a position randomly displaced, up to60.24 visual an-
gle, horizontally and vertically from its corresponding position in
a regular grid of 22 rows 3 30 columns, spanning correspondingly
34 3 46 in visual angle. Each stimulus bar was 0.12 3 1.1 in visual
angle and 48 cd (candela)/m2 in brightness. The background was
black. The target’s grid location was randomly one of those closest
to the circle of about 15 eccentricity, and beyond 12 of horizontal
eccentricity, from the display center. The fixation stimulus was
a bright disk of 0.3 diameter at the display center.
Procedures
Gazes were tracked by the 50 Hz infrared video eye tracker from
Cambridge Research System (www.crsltd.com). Tracking calibra-
tion was performed before each data session to a precision typically
within 0.5 of visual angle. After being shown two examples of each
stimulus condition, untrained subjects were instructed to fixate cen-
trally until the stimulus onset and to freely move their eyes after-
wards for target searching. The sequence of events in a trial was
as follows: (1) With the fixation stimulus, the subject pressed a button
to start a trial and eye tracking. (2) After 0.6 s, upon the subject’s
continuous fixation for 40 ms within 3 of the fixation point, a blank
screen replaced the fixation stimulus for 200 ms and was followed
by the onset (designated as time zero) of search stimulus. (3) In ex-
periment I, the search stimulus remained till after the subject’s but-
ton press. In experiment II, a mask replaced the search stimulus at
a time determined as follows: In a gaze-contingent trial, the mask
onset occurred at time T after the first gaze arrival at the target.
The criterion for the arrival was when the gaze was within 2.3 in vi-
sual angle from the target’s center position. T was randomly chosen
from the set T = (0, 100, 500, 1000, and 2000) ms for data sessions
contributing to Figure 3C, and for a different group of subjects,
from the set T = (0 and 1500) ms or T = (0, 1000, and 1500) ms for ses-
sions contributing to Figure 3D and Figures 4A and 4B. For each
non-gaze-contingent trial, a time t was chosen randomly and uni-
formly from the time window 200–1700 ms. The mask onset oc-
curred upon the first gaze arrival at the opposite (laterally from the
center) side of the target since 200 ms after stimulus onset or at
time t, whichever was sooner. The mask, once displayed, remained
until after the subject’s button press. Each session of experiment I
had 200 trials, randomly interleaving conditions Asimple, Bsimple, A,
B, A0, B0, and A0simple and other control conditions. In experiment
II, each blocked session for condition A had 130 or 60 trials, and
each interleaving session (of conditions A and B) had 100 trials. After
each session of experiment II, we verified that subjects did not no-
tice any links between the mask onsets and the gaze positions. Dif-
ferent subjects participated in experiments I and II.
Data Analysis
A trial is defined as a bad trial and removed from further analysis if
gaze was untracked in more than 10% of the video frames of the
eye tracker within the time window (0, RThand) or if RThand < 100
ms. Data from a subject or session when bad trials comprised
more than 10% of all trials are removed from further analysis. Suffi-
ciently large gaze-tracking error can lead to failures in detecting
gaze arrivals at the target. A trial is called a nonarrival trial if the
gaze never arrived at the target by our arrival criteria with the tracker
measurements. We thus remove from further analysis subjects and
data sessions having more than 11% of nonarrival trials among all
trials in experiment I or among the gaze-contingent trials in experi-
ment II. Results in figures were based on the gaze-arrival trials
only. The RTs plotted were based on trials with correct button re-
sponses. The error bars plotted represent the standard error of the
mean (SEM). Statistical tests for differences between different
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31conditions in Figure 2 were by two-tailed t test, whereas those in Fig-
ures 3 and 4 were by one-tail matched sample t test.
Supplemental Data
Supplemental Data include additional Experimental Procedures and
can be found with this article online at http://www.current-biology.
com/cgi/content/full/17/1/26/DC1/.
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